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RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL VIRTUES AND 
VALUES IN CONGRUENCE OR CONFLICT?:  
ON SMITH, BOB JONES UNIVERSITY, AND  
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY 
Linda C. McClain∗
“Laws,” we said, “are made for the government of actions, and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they 
may with practices. . . .  Can a man excuse his practices to the 
contrary because of his religious belief?  To permit this would be to 
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of 
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto 
himself.” 
—Justice Scalia, Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith1
 
“Only an especially important governmental interest pursued by 
narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First 
Amendment [religious] freedoms as the price for an equal share of 
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” 
—Justice O’Connor, Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith2
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A basic tension in the United States constitutional and political 
order exists between two important ideas about the relationship between 
civil society and the state: (1) families, religious institutions, and other 
parts of civil society are foundational sources, or “seedbeds,” of virtues 
and values that undergird constitutional democracy; and (2) these same 
 ∗  Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  
Thanks to Professor Marci Hamilton and the editors of the Cardozo Law Review for inviting me 
to participate in the conference that led to this Symposium.  Thanks to Hallie Marin for valuable 
research assistance and to Boston University School of Law for supporting this project with a 
summer research grant.  Comments are welcome: lmcclain@bu.edu. 
 1 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)). 
 2 Id. at 895 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 728 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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institutions are places that guard against governmental orthodoxy and 
overweening governmental power by generating their own distinctive 
virtues and values and by being independent locations of power and 
authority.3  The first idea envisions a comfortable congruence between 
nongovernmental associations and government.  By this, I mean that the 
values and virtues of each, the habits and skills cultivated in each 
domain, are in agreement.  Families, schools (including post-secondary 
institutions), and religious institutions all enjoy recognition as 
prominent sites for nurturing virtues and values and engaging in social 
reproduction that sustain democracy.  So too, the many voluntary 
associations that adults and young people join enjoy constitutional 
protection as places where there is freedom of expressive association.  
Political theorist Nancy Rosenblum refers to the “logic of congruence,” 
or the premise that civil society supports a liberal democratic order, as a 
“liberal expectancy.”4  In his account of political liberalism, for 
example, John Rawls describes the “background culture” of civil 
society as a “fund of implicitly shared ideas and principles” that 
undergird a shared political conception of justice.5  They “establish[] a 
social world within which alone we can develop with care, nurture, and 
education, and no little good fortune, into free and equal citizens.”6  
Similarly, Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus reflects the 
conviction, or liberal expectancy, that, although civil and political 
society each have values and virtues distinct and appropriate to them, 
civil society underwrites constitutional democracy because citizens can 
affirm a political conception of justice as “derived from, or congruent 
with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values.”7  The 
alternative formulation (“or at least not in conflict with”) suggests a 
more relaxed criterion: Civil and political society are distinct, and one’s 
personal values and virtues need not be identical to those of 
constitutional democracy, but harmony is possible so long as the former 
somehow support the latter.  Rosenblum refers to the idea that the 
institutions of civil society serve as “mediating associations,” sites for 
the cultivation not of specifically “liberal democratic dispositions,” but 
 3 I discuss this familiar tension in other work: LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: 
FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (2006); Linda C. McClain, Negotiating 
Gender and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: The Place of Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569 
(2004); Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and 
Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617 (2001); Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some 
Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2000). 
 4 NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM 
IN AMERICA 36-41 (1998). 
 5 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 14 (1993). 
 6 Id. at 43. 
 7 Id. at 11. 
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of “a whole range of moral dispositions, presumably supportive of 
political order.”8
What happens, however, when values and virtues generated by 
other nongovernmental institutions are in seeming conflict with political 
values and virtues?  The second idea about the relationship between 
civil society and government recognizes this potential for conflict.  
Government’s formative project of cultivating good citizenship may 
clash with the formative tasks of religious institutions and voluntary 
associations.  To use the parlance of civil society, what if certain 
associations sow bad seeds or are weedbeds of vice instead of seedbeds 
of civic virtue?9  The United States constitutional order builds on this 
tension between civil society as congruent with, as opposed to a buffer 
against, the state by recognizing the fundamental right—and 
responsibility—of parents for the care, custody, and education of their 
children, even as it recognizes education of the young as perhaps the 
most important function of government.10  Classic parental liberty cases 
affirm that the state can go “very far indeed”11 in inculcating good 
citizenship in children, but may not rely on measures that veer toward 
coercive imposition of a governmental orthodoxy.  The possibility of 
this conflict invites the question of how much pluralism a healthy 
constitutional democracy can sustain in a system in which there coexist 
multiple sites of sovereignty12 and the ideal of unity amidst diversity.  
What limits must government respect, for example, when it regulates 
behavior to advance political values, such as a principle that free and 
equal citizenship requires being free from discrimination on certain 
bases? 
When the issue is tensions between religious and political values, 
one obvious constitutional limit is that government may not compel 
 8 ROSENBLUM, supra note 4, at 41. 
 9 There is a lack of consensus among proponents of renewing civil society on the issue of 
congruence.  See McClain & Fleming, supra note 3, at 313 (“Commentators on civil society find 
themselves in sharp conflict over ‘congruence’—the idea that the internal structures and norms of 
voluntary associations should (or must) be democratic, participatory, and civil if they are to 
promote broader societal aims of political democracy.” (quoting NAT’L COMM’N ON CIVIC 
RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: HOW CIVIC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 41 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  I borrow the term 
“weedbeds of vice” from Eileen McDonagh, who suggested it in conversation. 
 10 Compare Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (noting Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty of parents to “bring up children” and, “[c]orresponding to the right of 
control,” “the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in 
life”), and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down statute that 
“unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control”), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) 
(describing education as “perhaps the most important function of state and local governments”). 
 11 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400. 
 12 See Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 477 (2000). 
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religious belief.  This offends the principle of toleration, reflected in the 
constitutional protection of the free exercise of religion.  Political 
liberalism, for example, maintains that given the “fact of reasonable 
pluralism” that results when persons are free to exercise their moral 
powers, uniformity of belief—or orthodoxy—would be possible only by 
the exercise of “intolerable” governmental power (the “fact of 
oppression”).13  Nor does our constitutional scheme permit government 
to favor one religious message over another or become entangled with 
religion.  This violates the First Amendment’s prohibition on the 
establishment of religion.  The robust protection of religious belief, 
however, does not extend entirely to religious practice, or religiously 
motivated conduct.  Religious exemptions are one pressure valve in the 
system: Government may afford religious institutions exemptions from 
certain laws in order to protect religious freedom.  Whether the U.S. 
Constitution requires such exemptions is another matter, and the subject 
of the landmark case that forms the basis for this Symposium: 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith.14  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia, quoted above, warns 
that unfettered freedom of religious practice—and a constitutional 
entitlement to religious exemptions from general laws—would allow 
each person “to become a law unto himself,” exempt from all manner of 
“civic obligations.”15  Concurring in the judgment, but not the 
majority’s reasoning, Justice O’Connor warns that abandoning the 
compelling state interest test for encroachments on religious liberty 
risks unjustified sacrifices of religious freedoms “as the price for an 
equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other 
citizens.”16  And Justice Blackmun, in dissent, stresses the basic 
congruence between the values and interests underlying Oregon’s anti-
drug law, which was at issue, and the values and interests of the persons 
seeking a religious exemption from those laws (and the values of the 
Native American Church to which they belonged).17
In this Article, I take up the question of where Smith fits into the 
political and constitutional dilemma over congruence.  I argue that a 
close examination of the majority and dissenting opinions in Smith 
yields instructive views on congruence, on pluralism, and on how to 
resolve the clash between distinct constitutional values.  I then consider 
another significant Supreme Court case involving religious liberty and 
its limits: Bob Jones University v. United States,18 in which the Court 
 13 RAWLS, supra note 5, at 37. 
 14 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 15 Id. at 885, 888. 
 16 Id. at 895 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 728 (1986)). 
 17 Id. at 914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 18 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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upheld the Internal Revenue Service’s revocation of the university’s tax 
exempt status because of its racially discriminatory policies.  I contend 
that both cases are about the problem of congruence: the relationship 
between private and public, or associational and governmental, values 
and virtues.  Granted, Smith involved an outright prohibition of a 
religious practice, while Bob Jones University involved denial of a 
subsidy (tax exemption), but both well illustrate tensions over the place 
of associations—and of pluralism—in a constitutional democracy.  Both 
continue to feature in contemporary considerations of these issues.  
Neither of these cases lacks for legal commentary, but I believe that 
considering them together in the context of the challenges posed by 
congruence and pluralism will add something of value to that 
commentary.  To suggest the continuing relevance of these cases, I 
evaluate the various opinions in Christian Legal Society Chapter of the 
University of California, Hastings College of Law v. Martinez.19  I 
analyze this case because it squarely presents the issue of congruence, 
in the form of the clash between a public university’s attempts to carry 
out its educative mission through enforcing norms of antidiscrimination 
and a student organization’s freedom to choose its members and 
promote a particular message about sexuality. 
 
I.      READING SMITH AS A CASE ABOUT CONGRUENCE 
 
Smith, I suggest, reads instructively as a case about congruence.  
But first, a basic recital of the issue and holding: Justice Scalia, writing 
for the Court, frames the issue as: 
[W]hether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits 
the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within 
the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and 
thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons 
dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use.20
Smith’s controversial holding was that the application of a neutral, 
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action is not subject to 
a compelling state interest test, and that an exemption from such a law 
was not constitutionally required.  Like Justices O’Connor and 
Blackmun, many legal commentators (including some contributors to 
this Symposium) contend that this was a radical—and unjustified—
departure from the Court’s well-settled free exercise jurisprudence.21  
 19 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 20 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 21 Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]oday’s holding dramatically 
departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the 
question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental commitment to individual 
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By contrast, other contributors counter that Smith followed logically 
from prior Supreme Court precedents and that “the persistent claim that 
Smith radically altered free exercise doctrine is simply wrong.”22  In 
either case, Smith triggered more than one effort by Congress to 
overturn it by restoring religious freedom, and states continue to 
consider (and sometimes approve) their own religious freedom 
restoration acts.23
In this Article, I do not weigh in on the question of whether Smith 
was sound as a matter of constitutional interpretation.  Rather, in 
keeping with the Symposium’s aim of assessing its continuing relevance 
some twenty years later, I propose that it is of considerable 
contemporary interest on the issue of congruence and how to address 
the evident clash between religious liberty and government’s formative 
purposes, as well as the clash between religious values and virtues and 
political values and virtues. 
 
A.      When Religious and Civic Obligations Conflict:  
Obedience to General Laws as a Strategy for  
Handling Religious Diversity 
 
On this clash point, I begin with Justice Scalia’s invocation of the 
negative consequences both for duties of responsible citizenship and for 
government’s formative ends under a rule that would subject to strict 
scrutiny every general law that burdened religiously motivated conduct.  
In support, he turns to Justice Felix Frankfurter’s statement in the first 
flag salute case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis:24
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle 
for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a 
religious liberty.”); id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s] distorted view of our 
precedents leads the majority to conclude that strict scrutiny of a state law burdening the free 
exercise of religion is a ‘luxury’ that a well-ordered society cannot afford . . . .”).  For an 
instructive list of critical commentary, see Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at 
the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1671, 1671 n.2 (2011) (citing numerous articles).  For criticisms of Smith in this 
Symposium, see Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking 
Foundations of American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755 (2011); Steven D. Smith, 
Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why The Smith Decision May Be a Greater Loss Now 
than It Was Then, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2033 (2011). 
 22 See Hamilton, supra note 21. 
 23 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 
(2006), which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997).  For a discussion of subsequent laws, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms 
and Limits of Religious Accommodation: The Case of RLUIPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907 
(2011). 
 24 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). 
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general law not aimed at the promotion of restriction of religious 
beliefs.  The mere possession of religious convictions which 
contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve 
the citizens from the discharge of political responsibilities.25
In this passage, Justice Frankfurter speaks of the obligations of 
citizenship in terms of carrying out “political responsibilities.”26  He 
posits a lack of congruence when he refers to “religious convictions 
which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society.”27  But he 
imagines the lack of congruence can be overcome at the level of 
conduct: A religious person, even if his or her beliefs do not support 
political values, must still obey the law. 
In further support, Justice Scalia cites to Reynolds v. United 
States,28 in which the Court upheld, against a religious freedom 
challenge, criminal laws against polygamy.29  In Reynolds, the Court 
addressed the negative impact on citizenship of granting a religious 
exemption from those laws: 
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot 
interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with 
practices. . . .  Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because 
of his religious belief?  To permit this would be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.30
Scalia returns later in the Smith opinion to Reynolds’s warning 
about allowing a man “to become a law unto himself,” when he declares 
that this risk would follow from a rule that could only insist that a 
person obey the law if there were a lack of congruence between his 
religious beliefs and the law when the state’s interest was compelling.31  
Such a rule, he argues, “contradicts both constitutional tradition and 
common sense.”32
When Justice Scalia refers to the obligation to obey the law—and 
the risk posed by a constitutionally-mandated religious exemption from 
this obligation—he refers not only to laws aimed at preventing harmful 
conduct (such as the anti-drug law at issue) but also to laws carrying out 
a wide range of public policies.  He states: “The government’s ability to 
enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, 
like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend 
on measuring the effects of a governmental action of a religious 
 25 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville, 310 U.S. at 594-95). 
 26 Minersville, 310 U.S. at 594-95. 
 27 Id. 
 28 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 29 Id. at 166. 
 30 Id. at 166-67. 
 31 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167). 
 32 Id. at 885. 
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objector’s spiritual development.’”33  He warns against transplanting the 
compelling state interest tests from familiar fields like differential 
treatment on the ground of race or content-based regulation of speech to 
a more general test for governmental regulation: “What it produces in 
those other fields—equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of 
contending speech—are constitutional norms; what it would produce 
here—a private right to ignore generally applicable laws—is a 
constitutional anomaly.”34  Applying a compelling interest test across 
the board to all actions “thought to be religiously commanded”35 would 
risk anarchy and, in effect, impair good citizenship; it would “open the 
prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”36  The varied civic 
obligations he lists (each supported by a citation to a prior Supreme 
Court case, but called a “parade of horribles” by Justice O’Connor in 
her concurring opinion37) range from 
compulsory military service, to the payment of taxes, to health and 
safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, 
compulsory vaccination laws, . . . and traffic laws, to social welfare 
legislation such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, animal 
cruelty laws, environmental protection laws, and laws providing for 
equality of opportunity for the races.38
For this last civic obligation, “laws providing for equality of opportunity 
for the races,” Justice Scalia cites Bob Jones University v. United 
States,39 to which I turn in Part III. 
For Justice Scalia, cabining the compelling state interest test is a 
necessary consequence of America’s sheer religious diversity.  Rather 
than assuming a basic congruence between these diverse religious 
beliefs and civil laws, he assumes inevitable conflict of such laws with 
at least some religious beliefs.  Thus, given this diversity, an across the 
board application is an unaffordable “luxury”: 
Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but 
that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of 
religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of 
 33 Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).  
Scalia also invokes United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), which rejected a claim for a tax 
exemption by an Amish employer based on religious objection to Social Security.  Smith, 494 
U.S. at 880.  There, the Court observed that the tax system “could not function if denominations 
were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that 
violates their religious belief.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 
260). 
 34 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. 
 35 Id. at 888. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 38 Id. at 889 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
 39 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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them.  Precisely because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of 
people of almost every conceivable religious preference,” and 
precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we 
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as 
applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that 
does not protect an interest of the highest order.40
When a generally applicable law is at stake (rather than a law 
targeting religion), the compelling state interest test should be reserved 
for what Scalia refers to as “hybrid” situations, where a person 
conjoined a free exercise claim with another constitutional protection, 
such as freedom of speech or parental liberty.41  A famous example of 
such a “hybrid” case (mentioned by Scalia and discussed in Justice 
Blackmun’s Smith dissent) is Wisconsin v. Yoder,42 where the Court 
invalidated a compulsory school attendance law as applied to Amish 
parents who had religious grounds for not sending their children to high 
school.43  Another case he envisions is one “in which a challenge on 
freedom of association grounds would . . . be reinforced by Free 
Exercise concerns.”44  But he concludes that the present case is not a 
“hybrid situation,” but “a free exercise claim unconnected with any 
communicative activity or parental right.”  The absence of a hybrid 
claim in Smith—that is, that the drug law attempts “to regulate religious 
beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s 
children in those beliefs”—seems to reinforce Scalia’s conclusion that 
Reynolds should control.  Again, he returns to the language of duty and 
the strategy of resolving a lack of congruence by insistence upon 
obedience to law: “Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the 
proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an 
objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.”45
Smith’s contemplation of a “hybrid situation” itself is the source of 
confusion and controversy, including among lower courts applying 
Smith, and may account for the migration of free exercise claims into 
freedom of expressive association ones.46  Indeed, as I discuss in Part 
 40 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)). 
 41 Id. at 881-82. 
 42 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 43 Id. at 207. 
 44 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (analogizing to Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 
(1984), which stated: “An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the 
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by 
the State [if] a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also 
guaranteed.”). 
 45 Id. (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971)). 
 46 Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment Division v. Smith: 
Same-Sex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2009 
(2011); see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 97-98 (1st Cir. 2008) (“What the Court meant by 
its discussion of ‘hybrid situations’ in Smith has led to a great deal of discussion and 
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IV, the Christian Legal Society chapter at Hastings combined a Free 
Exercise objection to Hastings’s antidiscrimination policy with free 
speech and freedom of association claims.47
Finally, another notable aspect of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
is his conclusion that religious objectors to general laws may seek 
exemptions through the democratic process.  He assures: “Values that 
are protected against governmental interference through enshrinement 
in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political 
process.”48  He opines that “a society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous 
of that value in its legislation.”49  At the time of his writing, many states 
did have such exemptions, as did the federal government.  His point, 
however, is that such exemptions are permissible, but not 
constitutionally required.  His ultimate observation is about reliance on 
the democratic process, which he acknowledges could place minority 
religious practices at a “relative disadvantage.”50  Nonetheless, “that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred 
to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which 
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of 
all religious beliefs.”51
This final observation raises the question of whether the majority 
opinion’s concern about each conscience being a law unto itself 
pertained particularly to “minority” religions, be it the nineteenth 
century Mormons or the contemporary members of the Native 
American Church.  Did Smith and Black lose because they belonged to 
an unfamiliar, or “weird religion,” whose ceremonial ingestion of 
peyote seemed worlds apart from the ceremonial ingestion, by 
Christians, of wine for communion?52   Did the Amish, a minority 
religion, win in Yoder because the Court found in their way of life 
traces of America’s own rural roots and a basic congruence between 
their values and those of good citizenship?  As we shall see, Justice 
Blackmun invokes Yoder in his emphasis on congruence. 
disagreement. . . .  No published circuit court opinion . . . has ever applied strict scrutiny to a case 
in which plaintiffs argued they had presented a hybrid claim.”). 
 47 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); infra Part III. 
 48 494 U.S. at 890. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argues that “respondents’ use of peyote seems closely 
analogous to the sacramental use of wine by the Roman Catholic Church,” which, during 
Prohibition, was exempted from the general ban on possession and use of alcohol.  Id. at 913 n.6 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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B.     Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence: What Sacrifices Must  
Religious Persons Make for the Benefits of Citizenship? 
 
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment of the Court, but 
wrote separately, joined in parts of her opinion by three dissenting 
Justices—liberals Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun—to stress her 
disagreement with its First Amendment analysis.  She rejects the 
Court’s extraction from its free exercise precedents of “the single 
categorical rule that ‘if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . [is] 
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise 
valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.’”53  She 
draws on Yoder for the point that “[b]elief and action cannot be neatly 
confined in logic-tight compartments.”54  She argues that “[b]ecause the 
First Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and 
religious conduct, conduct motivated by sincere religious belief, like the 
belief itself, must be at least presumptively protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause.”55  She rejects the Court’s distinction between laws 
“that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious 
practices,” saying the First Amendment does not make such a 
distinction. 
Of particular relevance to the consideration of congruence is her 
discussion of citizenship and sacrifice.  She notes that established First 
Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that “the freedom to act, unlike 
the freedom to believe, cannot be absolute.”  Here, she cites to 
Reynolds.  The compelling state interest and narrow tailoring test 
respect the First Amendment as well as governmental interest in 
regulating conduct.56  She articulates the value of this test in terms of 
citizenship, namely, to guard against undue sacrifice by religious 
persons of their freedoms as the price of equal citizenship.  She states: 
The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment’s 
command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it 
occupies a preferred position, and that the Court will not permit 
encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless 
required by clear and compelling governmental interests “of the 
highest order[.]”  “Only an especially important government interest 
pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice 
 53 Id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 54 Id. at 893 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1973)). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 894. 
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of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the 
rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”57
This statement implies that there may be situations in which such a 
sacrifice is justified, but that a strict test gives due weight to the 
constitutional value of religious liberty.  In other words, O’Connor 
contemplates that there may not be congruence between religious 
beliefs and practices and the obligations of citizenship, and argues that 
our constitutional order permits this lack of congruence to stand unless 
what is at stake are governmental interests “of the highest order.”58
O’Connor rejects the majority’s casting of decisions like Yoder as 
“hybrid” in order to distinguish them.  Rather, she counters that so-
called hybrid cases are part of the “mainstream” of free exercise 
jurisprudence.59  Thus, in the cases cited by the majority as examples of 
its categorical rule about laws of general application, the Court “rejected 
the particular constitutional claims before us only after carefully 
weighing the competing interests.”60
O’Connor, whose jurisprudence often reflected a concern about a 
person’s standing in a community, returns to the themes of sacrifice of 
freedom and the price of inclusion.  For example, she rejects the 
majority’s distinction between direct and indirect burdens on religious 
practice, stressing instead the effect of both kinds of restrictions on the 
religious person’s place in the “civil community”: 
[T]he essence of a free exercise claim is relief from a burden 
imposed by government on religious practices or beliefs, whether the 
burden is imposed directly through laws that prohibit or compel 
specific religious practices, or indirectly through laws that, in effect, 
make abandonment of one’s own religion or conformity to the 
religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in the civil 
community.61
Pertinent both to Bob Jones University and Christian Legal 
Society, she also rejects the distinction between a state’s affirmative 
prohibition of religious conduct and a state’s conditioning receipt of 
benefits on conduct prohibited by religious beliefs.  Both those cases 
involve the latter type of regulation.  She contends that “[t]he Sherbert 
compelling interest test applies in both kinds of cases.” 
O’Connor’s stance is similar to the majority’s in recognizing that 
duty and social order are legitimate bases for regulation.  In this sense, 
she recognizes the tension between the norms and practices of civil 
society and democratic norms and practices.  She differs in insisting that 
 57 Id. at 895 (citations omitted) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 728 (1987)). 
 58 Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215). 
 59 Id. at 896. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 897. 
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when Free Exercise is involved, the Constitution requires government to 
show an overriding interest: 
Legislatures, of course, have always been “left free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”  
Yet because of the close relationship between conduct and religious 
belief, “[i]n every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as 
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected 
freedom.” . . .  To me, the sounder approach . . . is to apply this test 
in each case to determine whether the burden on the specific 
plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant and whether the 
particular criminal interest asserted by the State before us is 
compelling. . . .  Given the range of conduct that a State might 
legitimately make criminal, we cannot assume, merely because a law 
carries criminal sanctions and is generally applicable, that the first 
Amendment never requires the State to grant a limited exemption for 
religiously motivated conduct.62
More so than the majority opinion, O’Connor stresses that 
competing constitutional rights and values are at stake.  Freedom of 
religion is a favored activity, entitled to special protection.  Far from 
being a constitutional “anomaly,” it is as much a “constitutional nor[m]” 
as freedom of speech or freedom from race discrimination.63  She 
reiterates that religious conscience can be violated by general laws or 
laws aimed at religion: 
There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general 
applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral toward 
religion can coerce a person to violate his religious conscience or 
intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at 
religion. . . .  We have in any event recognized that the Free Exercise 
Clause protects values distinct from those protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause.  As the language of the Clause itself makes clear, 
an individual’s free exercise of religion is a preferred constitutional 
activity.64
She takes on Scalia’s “parade of horribles”—the numerous civic 
obligations supposedly at risk if the compelling state interest test applies 
to all Free Exercise claims.  She argues that this list fails to demonstrate 
a reason for abandoning the compelling state interest test.  To the 
contrary, it demonstrates the opposite: “that courts have been quite 
capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible 
balances between religious liberty and competing state interests.”65
 62 Id. at 899-900 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 
(1878); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)). 
 63 Id. at 901. 
 64 Id. at 901-02. 
 65 Id. at 902. 
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Finally, O’Connor stresses that the compelling interest test 
preserves religious liberty in a pluralistic society.  She rejects Justice 
Scalia’s argument that “disfavoring of minority religions is an 
‘unavoidable consequence’ under our system of government and that 
accommodation of such religions must be left to the political process.”66  
Instead, she points out that “the history of our free exercise doctrine 
amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on 
unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and the Amish.”67  The First Amendment “was enacted 
precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not 
shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility.”68  While 
Justice Scalia cites to Gobitis, the first flag salute case, Justice 
O’Connor quotes Justice Jackson’s famous words in the second flag 
case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which 
overruled Gobitis: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond 
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts.  One’s right to life, liberty, and 
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and 
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to 
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.69
O’Connor then turns to another 1940s precedent about the 
Founders’ understanding of the need for religious toleration as a 
strategy for avoiding violent disagreement over religious creeds.  The 
idea expressed in that case is akin to Rawls’s emphasis on toleration as 
arising out of the Wars of Religion and as a contemporary necessity in 
light of the facts of reasonable pluralism and of coercion: 
The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and 
extreme views of religious sects, of the violence of disagreement 
among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all 
men would agree.  They fashioned a charter of government which 
envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views.70
This passage also contemplates, similar to Rawls’s political 
liberalism, that it is possible to have an organized political order (a 
shared political conception of justice) without a unified, shared religious 
philosophy (or what Rawls calls a comprehensive view).71  O’Connor 
concludes: “The compelling interest test reflects the First Amendment’s 
mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 903 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 70 Id. (quoting United States v. Bullard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944)). 
 71 RAWLS, supra note 5, at 10-15, 99, 206. 
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pluralistic society.  For the Court to deem this command a ‘luxury,’ is to 
denigrate ‘[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights.’”72
It bears mentioning that O’Connor believes established free 
exercise jurisprudence leads to the same result as the majority in Smith: 
The criminal prohibition of peyote does impose a “severe burden” on 
free exercise of respondents’ religion, since peyote is a “sacrament” and 
“vital” to religious practice, but Oregon has a “significant” interest in 
enforcing drug laws, given the problem of drug abuse.73  Congress has 
found “high potential for abuse” of peyote, as evidenced by its status as 
a controlled substance.74  Given that the Court has held the 
government’s interests in income tax collection, Social Security, and 
military conscription are compelling, so too Oregon has a “compelling 
interest” in prohibiting peyote possession by its citizens.75  What about 
the requested exemption?  She describes it as a “close” question, but 
finds that Oregon’s uniform application of its law is “essential” to 
accomplish its purpose.76  Health effects exist regardless of motive of 
users, so that “the use of such substances, even for religious purposes, 
violates the very purpose of the laws that prohibit them.”77  Uniformity 
of application is necessary to prevent trafficking.  Selective exemption 
would impair the state’s compelling interest in prohibiting possession.78
O’Connor distinguishes Yoder.  There, the Court found that 
accommodation would not “impair the physical or mental health of the 
child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the 
duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially 
detract from the welfare of society.”79  Here, “a religious 
exemption . . . would be incompatible with the State’s interest in 
controlling use and possession of illegal drugs.”80  In other words, there 
is a lack of congruence between exempting this religious practice and 
the state’s goals.  Like the majority, she observes that the fact that the 
federal government and several states provide exemptions is not the 
point: They may do so, but are not required to do so by the First 
Amendment.81  By contrast, as I now elaborate, Justice Blackmun 
stresses the basic congruence between religious practice and Oregon’s 
goals. 
 72 Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted). 
 73 Id. at 903-04. 
 74 Id. at 904. 
 75 Id. at 904-05. 
 76 Id. at 905. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 906. 
 79 Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1973)). 
 80 Id. at 906. 
 81 Id. 
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C.      Justice Blackmun’s Congruence Argument: Why Members of  
the Native American Church Are Like the Amish 
 
Justice Blackmun dissented in Smith, joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall.  Like O’Connor, he argues that the majority opinion 
offers a “distorted view” of the Court’s precedents, by suggesting a 
distinction between laws of general applicability and laws singling out 
religion, and “effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law 
concerning the Religion Clauses of our Constitution.”82  That settled 
law is: “[A] statute that burdens the free exercise of religion. . . . may 
stand only if the law in general, and the State’s refusal to allow a 
religious exemption in particular, are justified by a compelling interest 
that cannot be served by less restrictive means.”83  Also like O’Connor, 
he sharply disagrees with Scalia’s assessment of the compelling state 
interest test as a “‘luxury’ that a well-ordered society cannot afford,” 
and with his implication that “the repression of minority religion is an 
‘unavoidable consequence of democratic government.’”84  To the 
contrary, tolerance is part of the constitutional framework: “[T]he 
Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious 
persecution [not] a “luxury,” but an essential element of liberty . . . .”85
Justice Blackmun parts company with Justice O’Connor, however, 
in his answer to the “critical question . . . whether exempting 
respondents from the State’s general criminal prohibition ‘will unduly 
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.’”86  In effect, 
Justice Blackmun argues there is congruence between the state’s values 
and interests and those of the persons seeking a religious exemption.  
Rather than framing the state’s interest in very general terms (fighting 
the war on drugs), the frame should be in the specific terms of what the 
state’s “narrow interest” is in refusing to make an exception for the 
religious, ceremonial use of peyote.  In support, he cites Yoder, which 
focused on the specific question of how the sought exemption would 
impede state’s objectives.  As scholars of Free Exercise warn, he notes: 
The purpose of almost any law can be traced back to one or another 
of the fundamental concerns of government: public health and safety, 
public peace and order, defense, revenue.  To measure an individual 
 82 Id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 83 Id. at 907. 
 84 Id. at 908-09. 
 85 Id. at 909. 
 86 Id. 
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interest directly against one of these rarified values inevitably makes 
the individual interest appear the less significant.87
Turning to this more narrowly framed question, Blackmun points 
out that Oregon has not tried to prosecute religious use of peyote, so 
what seems to be at issue is “symbolic preservation of an unenforced 
prohibition.”88  But governmental interest in symbolism “cannot suffice 
to abrogate the constitutional rights of individuals.”89  Evidence of harm 
is “speculative” since the state offered no evidence of harm from 
ceremonial use of peyote.  Moreover, the federal government and 
twenty-three states have statutory or judicially created exemptions for 
religious use of peyote (the fact that exemptions are common seems to 
distinguish the case from Reynolds, where the federal government and 
the states uniformly outlawed polygamy). 
Justice Blackmun stresses the basic harmony, or congruence, 
between the values and interests advanced by the drug laws and those of 
the Native American Church.  For one thing, the “carefully 
circumscribed ritual context in which respondents used peyote is far 
removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of 
unlawful drugs.”90  He draws an analogy between this ritual use and the 
sacramental use of wine in the Roman Catholic Church, which was 
exempted from Prohibition-era laws banning alcohol.91  In his 
congruence argument, he stresses both the harmony between the values 
of the Native American Church and those behind Oregon’s drug laws 
and the basic similarity between the Native American Church and the 
Amish.  To appreciate this latter analogy, recall Chief Justice Burger’s 
reference, in the majority opinion in Yoder, to the Amish as self-
sufficient, “productive,” “very law-abiding” members of society, who 
reject public welfare, and reminiscent of the “sturdy yeoman” of 
America’s past, celebrated by Thomas Jefferson.92  Blackmun explains 
the analogy: 
Moreover, just as in Yoder, the values and interests of those seeking 
a religious exemption in this case are congruent, to a great degree, 
with those the State seeks to promote through its drug laws.  Not 
only does the church’s doctrine forbid nonreligious use of peyote, it 
 87 Id. at 910 (quoting J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 327, 330-31 (1969)).  Justice Blackmun also quotes Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social 
Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943).  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands with respect to other claims or 
demands, we must be careful to compare them on the same plane . . . [or else] we may decide the 
question in advance of our very way of putting it” (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 88 Smith, 494 U.S. at 911 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 913. 
 91 Id. at 913 n.6. 
 92 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222, 225-26 (1972). 
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also generally advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility, and 
abstinence from alcohol.93
In support, Blackmun invokes the role the Church plays in fighting 
alcoholism and cites to an amicus brief explaining that the Church’s 
“ethical code” has four parts: brotherly love, care of family, self-
reliance, and avoidance of alcohol.94  He stresses the basic congruence 
between religious and governmental values, and how the former can 
support the latter: 
There is considerable evidence that the spiritual and social support 
provided by the church has been effective in combating the tragic 
effects of alcoholism on the Native American population. . . .  Far 
from promoting the lawless and irresponsible use of drugs, Native 
American Church members’ spiritual code exemplifies values that 
Oregon’s drug laws are presumably intended to foster.95
Blackmun then stresses another analogy to Yoder: Just as with the 
Amish’s claim for a religious exemption from schooling, few religious 
groups other than the Native American Church could successfully get a 
religious exemption from the anti-drug laws without undermining the 
state’s goals.  Thus, the Court should reject Oregon’s floodgates 
argument—that granting this exemption will lead to a “flood of other 
claims to religious exceptions.”96  The state’s “apprehension” about a 
flood of other religious claims is “purely speculative,” given that the 
experience of the many states that maintain an exemption is to the 
contrary.97  Implicitly, Blackmun seems to be appealing to Yoder here 
too: Only Native Americans have successfully received religious 
exemption from drug laws in other states, hence granting this exemption 
will not undermine the state’s general educational goals.  Again, he 
reiterates the basic harmony between the state’s interest and this 
religious practice: “The unusual circumstances that make the religious 
use of peyote compatible with the State’s interests in health and safety 
and in preventing drug trafficking would not apply to other religious 
claims.”98
Blackmun returns explicitly to Yoder when he emphasizes the 
special circumstances that make religious use of peyote by this religion 
different, such that the state granting this religion an exemption for 
 93 Smith, 494 U.S. at 914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (citing Yoder, 
406 U.S. at 224, 228-230 (since the Amish accept formal schooling up to 8th grade, and then 
provide “ideal” vocational education, State’s interest in enforcing its law against the Amish is 
“less substantial than . . . for children generally”)). 
 94 Id. (citing Brief Amici Curiae Ass’n on American Indian Affairs et al. in Support of 
Respondents, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213)). 
 95 Id. at 915.  He also notes that there is “practically no illegal traffic in peyote,” even though 
the state appeals to an interest in abolishing drug trafficking.  Id. at 916. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 917. 
 98 Id. at 918. 
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religious peyote use but “deny[ing] other religious claims arising in 
different circumstances, would not violate the Establishment Clause.”99  
The state fulfills its obligation to “treat all religions equally, and not 
favor one over another . . . by the uniform application of the 
‘compelling interest’ test to all free exercise claims, not by reaching 
uniform results as to all claims.”100 Accordingly, 
[a] showing that religious peyote use does not unduly interfere with 
the State’s interests is “one that probably few other religious groups 
or sects could make.”  [T]his does not mean that an exemption 
limited to peyote use is tantamount to an establishment of 
religion.101
Blackmun draws a further analogy between the Amish and 
members of the Native American Church as special cases when he 
stresses the “potentially devastating impact” that Oregon’s law might 
have on members of the Native American Church: “If Oregon can 
constitutionally prosecute them for this act of worship, they, like the 
Amish, may be ‘forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant 
region.’”102  Blackmun fortifies this impact argument by taking note of 
“the federal policy—reached in reaction to many years of religious 
persecution and intolerance—of protecting the religious freedom of 
Native Americans.”103  He concludes that, lest Congressional policy and 
the First Amendment offer “merely an unfulfilled and hollow promise,” 
the Court should “scrupulously apply its free exercise analysis to the 
religious claims of Native Americans, however unorthodox they may 
be.”104
This reference to “unorthodox” religious claims at the end brings 
to mind the criticism that the claimants lost in Smith because they 
belonged to a “weird” religion, while the Amish won in Yoder because 
Chief Justice Berger saw in them the yeoman farmers of America’s 
past, virtuous and admirable in their self-sufficiency.  Yet the point 
Blackmun advances in his dissent is that the members of the Native 
American Church are like the Amish in having religious practices that 
are more congruent with than harmful to important state purposes.  
Thus, he makes both a congruence argument in defense of the 
exemption as well as a plea for religious tolerance of the unorthodox, to 
the extent the religious practices are different but not harmful to the 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. (citation omitted). 
 102 Id. at 920 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972)). 
 103 Id. at 920-21 (citing the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982), which protects 
religious freedom of Native Americans and includes Congressional recognition of ceremonial use 
of peyote and its necessary role in the “cultural integrity of the tribe, and, therefore, religious 
survival” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1308, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262)). 
 104 Id. at 921. 
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state’s interest.  The Amish and the Native American Church are also 
special cases because of the potential for “devastating impact” if they 
are forbidden to engage in their religious practice.  This idea of the 
Amish as presenting a special case, such that few others could 
successfully claim an exemption, echoes in many contemporary Free 
Exercise challenges.105  After all, Scalia mentioned Yoder as a 
successful “hybrid” claim that warranted more searching review than 
the rule announced in Smith.  Typically, however, courts invoke the 
Amish to reject the Free Exercise challenge because the religious parties 
are not similarly situated to the Amish.106  The special case seems, then, 
to have two features: (1) there is harmony between religious values and 
practice and the state’s interests, at least to the extent that the former are 
“compatible” with the state’s interest; and (2) to deny the exemption 
would have uniquely harmful consequences to the claimants. 
 
II.      ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT CASE ABOUT CONGRUENCE:  
BOB JONES UNIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES 
 
In Bob Jones University v. United States,107 the United States 
Supreme Court rejected a challenge brought by Bob Jones University, a 
Christian school, to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) denial of 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to the university because of its racially 
discriminatory practices.  One immediate link between Smith and this 
case is that Justice Scalia cites to it in his cautionary list in Smith of the 
types of laws that a constitutional right to a religious exemption from a 
neutral, generally applicable law would threaten (“laws providing for 
equality of opportunity for the races”).108  But a deeper link is that, like 
 105 Although it is beyond the scope of the present Article, I should note that Yoder is not 
without its critics, most famously Justice Douglas, in dissent.  In this Symposium, James Dwyer 
argues that while the “central holding of Smith is very congenial to the family law academy,” 
because its limiting of a right to religious exemptions is supportive of the use of state power to 
protect vulnerable persons in private, Smith’s apparent “reaffirmation of Yoder” and “suggestion 
that [Smith’s] central principle simply would not apply to religious parenting cases” (so-called 
“hybrid” cases) has undermined its holding in the family law realm.  James G. Dwyer, The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1781, 1781-82 (2011).  Also in this Symposium, Leslie Griffin discusses why Smith is “necessary 
to support women’s equality in the family and reproductive rights,” and criticizes courts and 
legislatures for not taking Smith seriously.  Leslie C. Griffin, Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1835 (2011). 
 106 See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 100 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing the applicability of 
Smith and distinguishing the situation of parents challenging Massachusetts’s diversity 
curriculum from that of parents in Yoder because the former do not face a threat to a “distinct 
community and lifestyle”). 
 107 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 108 Smith, 494 U.S. at 889. 
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Smith, Bob Jones University may be read instructively as a case about 
congruence. 
 
A.      Congruence Between Public and Civil Society Purposes 
 
A central reason that the Court affirmed the IRS’s denial is that the 
Court’s own prior decisions “stated that a public charitable use must be 
‘consistent with local laws and public policy.’”109  Here, the relevant 
public policy is “a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and 
discrimination in public education.”110  The Court, in a majority opinion 
written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, emphasized that this particular 
public policy is fundamental.  But it also acknowledged that until fairly 
recently, racial segregation was part of public education, legitimated in 
part by the Court’s own precedents.  However, Brown v. Board 
“signalled an end to that era” and the emergence of a “firm national 
policy” against segregation and discrimination in education.111  Chief 
Justice Burger recounted this shift: 
[T]here can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in 
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary 
justice.  Prior to 1954, public education in many places still was 
conducted under the pall of Plessy v. Ferguson; racial segregation in 
primary and secondary education prevailed in many parts of the 
country.  This Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education 
signalled an end to that era.  Over the past quarter of a century, every 
pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and 
Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial 
segregation and discrimination in public education.112
The very fact that the Nation struggled with and repudiated racial 
segregation fortified the Court’s conviction that current practices of 
discrimination were not congruent with public values and, therefore, not 
charitable.  Precisely because of the Nation’s extensive and vigorous 
debates over racial discrimination, and “the stress and anguish of the 
history of efforts to escape from the shackles of the ‘separate and equal’ 
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, it cannot be said that educational 
institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial discrimination, are 
institutions exercising ‘beneficial and stabilizing influences in 
community life.’”113
 109 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591 (quoting Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 501 
(1861)). 
 110 Id. at 593. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 593 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 113 Id. at 595 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)). 
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Part of the emergence of this “firm national policy” is the 
recognition that racial discrimination also violates the “rights of 
individuals.”114  The Court detailed its long line of cases asserting a 
“fundamental” and “pervasive” right of a student “not to be segregated 
in racial grounds in schools.”115
How do Bob Jones University’s practices clash with this 
fundamental, “firm,” national policy?  The University’s sponsors 
“genuinely believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and 
marriage,” leading it, initially, to exclude “Negroes” from admission, 
then to admit only Negroes married within their race, and, later, to 
admit Negroes, but subject to a disciplinary rule prohibiting interracial 
dating and marriage.116  The Court rejected the University’s Free 
Exercise claim.  It observes that “[n]ot all burdens on religion are 
unconstitutional . . . .  The state may justify a limitation on religious 
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding 
governmental interest.”117  The Court also observed that, by contrast to 
some applications of this test that upheld outright prohibition of 
religious conduct (“such as ‘neutrally cast’ child labor laws applied to 
prohibit street preaching by religious children”118), this case involved 
denial of a tax exemption.  The Court stated: “[D]enial of tax benefits 
will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private 
religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing 
their religious tenets.”119  Recall that in Smith Justice O’Connor argued 
that religious practice could be burdened just as seriously by the 
conditioning of benefits upon refraining from the practice as from 
outright denial. 
The Court explained that part of the reason that the government’s 
interest is so compelling—indeed, “fundamental” and “overriding”—in 
the present case is government’s own participation in perpetuating racial 
discrimination: “[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding 
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education—
discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 
years of this Nation’s history.  That governmental interest substantially 
outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners’ 
exercise of their religious beliefs.”120
Government, the Court continued, cannot accommodate the 
university’s practices consistent with pursuing that compelling 
governmental interest.  Bob Jones University argued, for example, that 
 114 Id. at 593. 
 115 Id. (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958)). 
 116 Id. at 580-81. 
 117 Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 603-04. 
 120 Id. at 604. 
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it allows all races to enroll, but just puts restrictions on their interracial 
association.  The Court countered that its precedents, such as Loving v. 
Virginia,121 “firmly establish that discrimination on the basis of racial 
affiliation and association is a form of racial discrimination.”122
Bob Jones University also argued that Congress had not explicitly 
referred to public policy in the definition of a 501(c)(3) corporation and 
the IRS overstepped its bounds in its rulings.  The Court rejected this by 
ruling that Congress had, since the inception of the tax code, invested 
broad administrative authority in the IRS.  The relevant point, for the 
Court, was that the IRS had consistently referred to principles of 
charitable trust law, that is, that a charity provides a truly “public” 
benefit.123  While the IRS should only make determinations that an 
entity is not worthy of “charitable status” when there can be no doubt 
that its activities violate fundamental public policy, that test was met 
here: 
[T]here can be no doubt as to the national policy.  In 1970, when the 
IRS first issued the ruling challenged here, the position of all three 
branches of the Federal Government was unmistakably clear. . . .  
Clearly an educational institution engaging in practices affirmatively 
at odds with this declared position of the whole government cannot 
be seen as exercising a “beneficial and stabilizing influenc[e] in 
community life.”124
Bob Jones University may continue with its discriminatory rule, 
the Court observed, but it may not be considered a tax-exempt charity 
so long as it does so.  In effect, government must tolerate, but need not 
subsidize, religious practice that offends fundamental national policies.  
Here, the Court stressed the importance of congruence when a tax 
exemption is sought.  Charitable trust laws, or common law standards of 
charity, require “that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve 
a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.”125  
The Court elaborated on the need for harmony or compatibility between 
a tax-exempt organization’s purposes and public purposes, explaining 
the place of charities in the political order: 
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt 
entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the 
community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which 
supplements and advances the work of public institutions already 
supported by tax revenues.  History buttresses logic to make clear 
that to warrant exemption under § 501(c)(3), an institution must fall 
within a category specified in that section and must demonstrably 
 121 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 122 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605. 
 123 Id. at 596-99. 
 124 Id. at 599 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)). 
 125 Id. at 586. 
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serve and be in harmony with the public interest.  The institution’s 
purposes must not be so at odds with the common community 
conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise 
be conferred.126
Striking here is the Court’s notion of tax-exempt charities as filling 
gaps—either by providing benefits not supplied by “society or the 
community”—and as supplementing, or complementing, the work of 
“public institutions.”  Decades after this case, national political leaders 
champion the place of faith-based and community-based institutions in 
filling such gaps and as vital partners with government to provide 
important public services and advance public policies.127  Also 
noteworthy is how the Chief Justice alternated between “harmony” with 
“the public interest” and not being “at odds” with “the common 
community conscience.”  Both of these expressions not only reiterate 
the importance of congruence, but also imply a unitary, rather than 
pluralistic, conception of the public interest or conscience. 
 
B.      Justice Powell’s Vision of Pluralism and the Public Good 
 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Bob Jones University aptly 
brings out another vision of the functions of the institutions of civil 
society: They are places in which pluralism is nourished, even through 
associations that honor values in conflict with current democratic 
values.  He suggested that congruence, or harmony between democratic 
and associational values, may not be key to government providing a 
benefit, that is, tax exempt status.  He agreed with the majority that the 
national policy against racial discrimination is sufficiently strong to 
override tax exemption in this particular case, but he disagreed with the 
Court’s reliance on common law rules about charities as a guide to tax-
exempt status; that is, “[c]haritable exemptions are justified on the basis 
that the exempt entity confers a public benefit.”128  Why?  He doubted 
that “all or even most of those [501(c)(3)] organizations could prove 
that they ‘demonstrably serve and [are] in harmony with the public 
interest’” or that they are “beneficial and stabilizing influences in 
community life.”129  Even a racially discriminatory institution, he 
argued, can contribute something to the community, namely, 
educational benefits, evident from “the substantially secular character of 
 126 Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added). 
 127 See Linda C. McClain, Unleashing or Harnessing “Armies of Compassion”?: Reflections 
on the Faith-Based Initiative, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 361 (2008). 
 128 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 608 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 129 Id. at 609. 
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the curricula and degrees offered” by Bob Jones University.130  Thus, he 
raises a general question about whether there is, or need be, harmony 
between a charity’s ends and the articulated public interest. 
Powell sounds the theme of associations guarding against 
governmental orthodoxy, an idea in tension with the “liberal 
expectancy” of congruence between civil society and the political order.  
His view of the proper understanding of pluralism is that such a lack of 
congruence is a salutary check on state power: 
Far from representing an effort to reinforce any perceived “common 
community conscience,” the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit 
groups is one indispensable means of limiting the influence of 
governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life.  
Given the importance of our tradition of pluralism, “[t]he interest in 
preserving an area of untrammeled choice for private philanthropy is 
very great.”131
Tolerance for diversity animates Powell’s emphasis on civil 
society’s buffering role.  Benignly, it seems, government sets up a 
scheme that facilitates this diversity.  This vision is in sharp contrast to 
the majority’s interpretation of the tax exemption laws as requiring 
congruence between associational ends and a seemingly unitary public 
interest and community conscience.  Powell remarked upon the 
enormous diversity among the thousand-page list of tax exempt 
organizations, named a few dozen (including the American Friends 
Service Committee, the Jehovah’s Witnesses in the United States, 
Union of Concerned Scientists Fund, Inc., and both the National Right 
to Life Educational Foundation and the Planned Parenthood Federation 
of America), and concluded: 
It would be difficult indeed to argue that each of these organizations 
reflects the views of the “common community conscience” or 
“demonstrably . . . [is] in harmony with the public interest.”  In 
identifying these organizations, largely taken at random from the 
tens of thousands on the list, I of course do not imply disapproval of 
their being exempt from taxation.  Rather, they illustrate the 
commendable tolerance by our Government of even the most 
strongly held divergent views, including views that at least from time 
to time are “at odds” with the position of our Government.”132
Powell quoted his own dissent in Mississippi University for Women 
v. Hogan, in which the Court, in the previous term, struck down 
Mississippi University for Women’s policy of admitting only female 
students to its nursing school.133  There, he observed: “A distinctive 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 609-10 (quoting Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 639 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(Friendly, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc)). 
 132 Id. at 610 n.3. 
 133 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982). 
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feature of America’s tradition has been respect for diversity.  This has 
been characteristic of the peoples from numerous lands who have built 
our country.  It is the essence of our democratic system.”134  He added 
that sectarian schools make an “important contribution” to this tradition 
by providing an “educational alternative for millions of young 
Americans” and “often afford[ing] wholesome competition with our 
public schools.”135  This notion of civil society’s institutions competing 
with governmental ones is a salient one in contemporary debates over 
the proper reach of public norms and antidiscrimination laws, where 
scholars inclined to Powell’s view of diversity call for a “moral 
marketplace” in which government is one actor, not a monopolist.136
Is there no place, on this view, for governmental orthodoxy?  Or 
must government fund regardless of how sharp the conflict between 
public and private values?  Powell acknowledged that these 
considerations about diversity may not always be dispositive and that, 
sometimes, governmental orthodoxy should prevail.137  Thus, with 
respect to Bob Jones University, he agreed with the Court that 
“Congress has determined that the policy against racial discrimination 
in education should override the countervailing interest in permitting 
unorthodox private behavior.”138
In Powell’s concurrence is the seed of an idea that features in 
contemporary debates over the U.S. constitutional order’s commitments 
to diversity and pluralism: Are these commitments best served by 
requiring that all institutions be open to all and practice no 
discrimination in membership or its terms and conditions, so that every 
group is a microcosm of the whole?  Or are they better served by 
allowing groups to pursue their distinctive goods and purposes, 
including exercising discrimination in who may be members, so that the 
macrocosm is diverse in the sense that it is made up of so many distinct 
groups?  Side-by-side with these questions is that of the role of 
government in subsidizing, or supporting, diversity and pluralism.  The 
majority’s distinction between tolerating and subsidizing associations 
whose values are not congruent with national commitments clashes with 
Powell’s vision of a form of toleration that includes subsidies for 
unorthodox associations because of their contribution to pluralism.  The 
 134 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 610 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 745 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
 135 Id. (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)). 
 136 See, e.g., ROBERT VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD (2010). 
 137 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 138 Id.  However, Justice Powell emphasizes that “the balancing of these substantial interests is 
for Congress to perform” and resists any suggestion that the IRS is “invested with authority to 
decide which public policies are sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to require denial of tax exemptions.”  
Id. at 611. 
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recent case of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez revisits these vexing 
questions, as I now discuss. 
 
III.      ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AS A VEHICLE FOR TEACHING  
SOCIAL COOPERATION AMIDST DIVERSITY:  
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ 
 
What is the import of Smith and Bob Jones University for 
contemporary challenges to governmental efforts to promote, as it were, 
an orthodoxy about antidiscrimination: that discrimination on certain 
bases is wrong and harms the individuals subject to it as well as society?  
Blackmun’s dissent in Smith emphasized that the Amish were a special 
case, and that the Native American Church offered a similar special case 
where a religious exemption would be in harmony with governmental 
aims.  The majority, by contrast, emphasized that, given America’s 
sheer religious diversity, many of government’s objectives might not be 
in harmony with religious beliefs and practices, and society would court 
anarchy if government had to satisfy a compelling state interest test to 
justify carrying out a myriad public policies.  Only a “hybrid case” 
warranted closer scrutiny. 
One reading of Bob Jones University is that racial discrimination is 
a special case, manifested by a “firm national policy” rectifying a 
shameful past practice of segregation.  This history and legacy 
distinguish it in kind from some other antidiscrimination policies that 
target, by deeming them “public accommodations,” private entities and 
associations, particularly those adopted by states or localities.  The 
“purpose” of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, including Title II’s  
bar on discrimination in public accommodations based on race, the 
Supreme Court has observed, was “to obliterate the effect of a 
distressing chapter of our history.”139  However, in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees, upholding Minnesota’s public accommodations law 
barring sex discrimination against the freedom of association claim of 
the Jaycees, the Court analogized the stigmatic injuries and denial of 
dignity stemming from denial of access to public accommodations 
based on race to dignitary injuries due to denials based on sex.140  The 
Court characterized Minnesota’s “historical commitment to eliminating 
discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly 
available goods and services” as “compelling state interests of the 
 139 Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315 (1964) (holding that, in light of the passage 
of Title II, pre-passage convictions under state trespass laws for sit-in demonstrations in luncheon 
facilities of retail stores should be abated). 
 140 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984). 
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highest order.”141  The Court cited Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, which upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
“object” of which “was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity 
that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments.’”142  It also invoked as its own anti-stereotyping Equal 
Protection sex equality jurisprudence.143  Invoking Jaycees, lower 
courts may admit sex discrimination as another special case, along with 
race, reflecting a governmental interest of the highest order.144  
Nonetheless, Martha Minow observes that, by contrast to race-based 
discrimination, the treatment of “gender-based distinctions in law and in 
society” is “more ambiguous,” perhaps due to “the pervasiveness of 
gender-based roles in religious practice and teachings.”145
What about discrimination based on sexual orientation?  Jonathan 
Turley finds the ruling in Bob Jones University incompatible with “the 
pluralistic ideals of our society,” and foresees that “gay rights and same-
sex marriage” will “reignite” this “controversy over tax-exempt status.”  
Society will “have to choose between the ideals of pluralism and equal 
treatment.”146  He grants that racially discriminatory policies of the sort 
followed by Bob Jones University are “bad for society,” observing that, 
“thankfully relatively few organizations follow racially discriminatory 
policies and those organizations tend to be fringe groups.”147  By 
contrast, “[i]t is far more common for mainstream religious and civil 
groups to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation” and the 
potential for those groups to be “disenfranchised,” (i.e., have their 
Section 501(c)(3) status challenged), applying the logic of Bob Jones 
 141 Id. at 624. 
 142 Id. at 625 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)).  I 
consider the import of Heart of Atlanta Motel for challenges to contemporary antidiscrimination 
law in Linda C. McClain, Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Law, and the Legacy of 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 71 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 143 U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S at 625 (citing, inter alia, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973)). 
 144 See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 714 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609) (“Only twice 
has the Supreme Court recognized the prevention of discrimination as an interest compelling 
enough to justify restrictions on constitutional rights.”), withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 
1999).  In the subsequent en banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that religious landlords’ free 
speech and free exercise challenges to state and local antidiscrimination laws that protected 
unmarried persons against discrimination in housing were not ripe for review.  Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 145  Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 781, 814 (2007) (observing similar ambiguous treatment for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation). 
 146 Jonathan Turley, An Unholy Union: Same-Sex Marriage and the Use of Governmental 
Programs to Penalize Religious Groups and Unpopular Practices, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 59, 67-68 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE]. 
 147 Id. at 68. 
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University, is “quite large.”148  On the other hand, Douglas Kmiec 
observes that “the IRS has refused explicitly to push Bob Jones beyond 
the topic of race” and there is simply not the same sort of “fundamental 
public policy” supporting same-sex marriage as that against racial 
discrimination.149
Like Turley, Robin Wilson also warns about the possible import of 
Bob Jones University’s rulings about tax-exempt organizations 
complying with “fundamental” public policy for religious objections to 
same-sex marriage and to providing goods and services to same-sex 
couples.150  Her analysis treats race as a special case.  Observing that 
many state public accommodations laws now include sexual orientation 
as a protected category, she notes the legislative concern for protecting 
dignity, but argues: 
While the parallels between racial discrimination and discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation should not be dismissed, it is not 
clear that the two are equivalent in this context.  The religious and 
moral convictions that motivate objectors to refuse to facilitate same-
sex marriage simply cannot be marshaled to justify racial 
discrimination.151
Of course, the objections to racial integration at Bob Jones 
University were religiously motivated.  Moreover, historically, 
opponents of interracial marriage invoked the Bible and God’s created 
order to support bans on such marriages.152  This raises the question of 
Wilson’s criteria for evaluating religious and moral convictions. 
One distinction is clear: In contrast to a firm national policy against 
ending racial discrimination and sex discrimination, no such firm 
national policy yet exists with respect to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, and certain federal laws (such as the Defense of Marriage 
Act) explicitly require such discrimination.  Indeed, federal law lags 
behind the law of many states, as it did with both race and sex 
discrimination.  When the Supreme Court, in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, upheld the Scouts’ claim that compelling it to admit a homosexual 
scoutmaster pursuant to the “public accommodations” provisions of 
New Jersey’s antidiscrimination violated its constitutional rights to 
freedom of association, the Court simply stated, without elaboration: 
“The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations 
 148 Id. 
 149 Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns, in 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 146, at 103, 109-10. 
 150 Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the 
Health Care Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 146, at 77. 
 151 Id. at 101. 
 152 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting the trial judge’s statement that: 
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on 
separate continents. . . .  The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the 
races to mix.”). 
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law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ right to 
freedom of expressive association.”153  Of course, with the recent repeal 
of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in the military and the Obama 
Administration’s announcement that it will no longer defend the 
Defense of Marriage Act, because of its judgment that the Act violates 
the equal protection clause by discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation, federal policy may be in a state of transition.154  And the 
Court’s own jurisprudence, both in Romer v. Evans155 and Lawrence v. 
Texas,156 reflects an evolution toward finding constitutionally 
problematic the singling out of persons for disfavored treatment on the 
basis of sexual orientation.157  With this as a backdrop, I now turn to 
how the Court assessed a recent challenge by a student chapter of the 
Christian Legal Society to Hastings University College of Law’s 
antidiscrimination policy. 
 
A.     The University’s Educational Mission and the  
     Distinction Between Carrots and Sticks 
 
In this case, petitioner excludes students who will not sign its 
Statement of Faith or who engage in “unrepentant homosexual 
conduct.”  The expressive association argument it presses, however, 
is hardly limited to these facts.  Other groups may exclude or 
mistreat Jews, blacks, and women—or those who do not share their 
contempt for Jews, blacks, and women.  A free society must tolerate 
such groups.  It need not subsidize them, give them its official 
imprimatur, or grant them equal access to law school facilities.158
 
Tolerance, cooperation, learning, and the development of conflict-
resolution skills . . . are obviously commendable goals, but they are 
not undermined by permitting a religious group to restrict 
membership to persons who share the group’s faith. . . .  Such 
practices are not manifestations of “contempt” for members of other 
faiths.  Nor do they thwart the objectives that Hastings endorses.  
 153 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
 154 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; Letter from 
Eric E. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 4 
(Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Eric E. Holder], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 155 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 156 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 157 Romer suggests the limits on states attempting to thwart local efforts to protect against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: no “singling out” of a “certain class of citizens 
for disfavored legal status” or making “a class of persons a stranger to [state] law.”  Romer, 517 
U.S. at 633, 635. 
 158 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2998 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
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Our country as a whole, no less than the Hastings College of Law, 
values tolerance, cooperation, learning, and the amicable resolution 
of conflicts.  But we seek to achieve those goals through “[a] 
confident pluralism that conduces to civil peace and advances 
democratic consensus building,” not by abridging First Amendment 
rights.159
 
Last term, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Supreme 
Court, by a narrow margin (5-4), upheld a public university’s 
antidiscrimination policy against a student group’s challenge that the 
university’s failure to grant it an exemption from the policy violated the 
group’s rights to expressive association, free speech, and free exercise 
of religion.  The Court had occasion to consider the question of the 
relationship among various forms of discrimination, as well as the 
import of both Smith and Bob Jones University for a public university’s 
efforts to advance its educational mission through an antidiscrimination 
policy applicable not just to the classroom but to campus life as well.  
The several opinions by the Justices offer sharply contrasting visions of 
the importance of congruence between democratic and associational 
values and of the best understanding of diversity and pluralism. 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, prefaces her opinion by 
stating the general rule that “the First Amendment generally precludes 
public universities from denying student organizations access to school-
sponsored forums because of the groups’ viewpoints.”160  But the 
“novel question” presented in this case was: “May a public law school 
condition its official recognition of a student group—and the attendant 
use of school funds and facilities—on the organization’s agreement to 
open eligibility for membership and leadership to all students?”161
Hastings Law School had a Nondiscrimination Policy, to which all 
registered student organizations (RSOs) were subject.  It stated, in 
relevant part: 
[Hastings] is committed to a policy against legally impermissible, 
arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory practices.  All groups, 
including administration, faculty, student governments, [Hastings]-
owned student residence facilities and programs sponsored by 
[Hastings], are governed by this policy of nondiscrimination.  
[Hastings’] policy on nondiscrimination is to comply fully with 
applicable law. 
[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex, or 
 159 Id. at 3015-16 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Brief of Gays & Lesbians 
for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)). 
 160 Id. at 2978 (majority opinion). 
 161 Id. 
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sexual orientation.  This nondiscrimination policy covers admission, 
access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and 
activities.162
Hastings interpreted this policy to mandate an “acceptance of all 
comers” by RSOs.  School-approved groups must “allow any student to 
participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions.”163
The Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society, an association 
of Christian lawyers and law students, which charters chapters at law 
schools throughout the county, sought an exemption from this policy.164  
The source of the conflict necessitating an exemption was that the 
chapters must adopt bylaws requiring members and officers to sign a 
“Statement of Faith” and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed 
principles, including the tenet that “sexual activity should not occur 
outside of marriage between a man and a woman.”165  CLS interpreted 
this to exclude from the group anyone who engages in “unrepentant 
homosexual conduct.”166  It also excluded students with religious 
convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith.167  (Notably, 
by contrast to the Boy Scouts of America’s “secret” policy opposing 
homosexuality as contrary to its mission, this policy is very public and 
very clear.168) 
Hastings rejected the request for an exemption.  It took the position 
that if CLS wished to operate within Hastings’ program of student 
groups, it must “open its membership to all students irrespective of their 
religious beliefs or sexual orientation.”169  The benefits attendant upon 
being an RSO included seeking financial assistance from the school, 
“which subsidizes their events using funds from a mandatory student-
activity fee imposed on all students.”170  RSOs could also use law 
school channels to communicate with students (such as a weekly 
newsletter, advertising on bulletin boards, and an annual student 
organization fair), apply to use Law School facilities for meetings and 
office space, and use the Law School’s name and logo.171
When Hastings denied CLS’s request for an exemption, it 
indicated that if CLS chose to operate outside the RSO system, it could 
 162 Id. at 2979 (quoting BD. OF DIRS. OF THE UNIV. OF CAL., HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, 
POLICIES AND REGULATIONS APPLYING TO COLLEGE ACTIVITIES, ORGANIZATIONS AND 
STUDENTS § 20 POLICY ON NONDISCRIMINATION (2002)). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 2980. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 672 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing Boy Scouts’ alleged policy against homosexuality as a “secret” policy). 
 169 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2980-81. 
 170 Id. at 2979. 
 171 Id. 
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still use Hastings facilities for meetings and activities and use 
chalkboards and campus bulletin boards to announce its events.  “In 
other words, Hastings would do nothing to suppress CLS’s endeavors, 
but neither would it lend RSO-level support for them.”172  As this line-
drawing noted by Justice Ginsburg indicates, this case illustrates a way, 
other than outright prohibition, that government may have an impact on 
a religious group: denial of a status to which benefits attach.  In this 
sense, it is more of a subsidy case (like Bob Jones) than a prohibition 
case. 
CLS declined to alter its bylaws, and, operating without RSO 
status, held weekly meetings and sponsored several events.  It sued 
Hastings for violation of federal constitutional rights to free speech, 
expressive association, and free exercise of religion.  It lost on all three 
claims in the federal district court and then, on appeal, in the Ninth 
Circuit.173  Rejecting CLS’s expressive association claim, the district 
court observed that Hastings was not “directly ordering CLS to admit” 
students; it was instead denying official recognition, and putting limits 
on funds and facilities, if it did not.174  Moreover, CLS met without this 
official status, suggesting the rule was “not a substantial 
impediment.”175  In a brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
concluding that Hastings’s open membership rule was “viewpoint 
neutral and reasonable”; it required that “all groups must accept all 
comers as voting members even if those individuals disagree with the 
mission of the group.”176
Christian Legal Society might well have expected, given the 
Supreme Court’s prior precedents on religious freedom in universities 
and freedom of association, that victory was likely.  How, after all, can 
Hastings’ open membership rule be squared with protection of freedom 
of expressive association?  How can a group “stand for” particular 
values, if it must admit as members persons who disagree with those 
values?  Why make the cost of official recognition be such unwanted 
association?  (Recall, for example, Justice O’Connor’s cautioning in 
Smith about making sure the price religious persons must pay to 
participate in society is constitutionally justified.)  What policy goal 
could Hastings be furthering that sufficiently outweighed this 
expressive freedom?  For example, what sense does it make to require 
the Hastings Democratic Caucus to allow students with Republican 
 172 Id. at 2981. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law 
v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645 (2009)). 
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political beliefs become members and seek leadership positions (an 
example used in the litigation)? 
Why, then, did the Court rule against the student organization?  
Justice Ginsburg began the majority opinion by observing that because 
Hastings is a public university, the relevant constitutional inquiry is 
when a governmental entity may place limits on speech occurring on its 
property.  Here, the precedent requires that “[a]ny access barrier must 
be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”177
The majority also looked to its public accommodations decisions, 
such as Dale and Jaycees, stating that restrictions on associational 
freedom are permitted only if they serve “compelling state interests” 
that are “unrelated to the suppression of ideas,” and cannot be advanced 
by “significantly less restrictive [means].”178  Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, after all, as Justice Ginsburg noted, observed that “freedom of 
association . . . presupposes a freedom not to associate.”179  That 
observation shaped the Court’s reasoning in favor of the Boy Scouts in 
Dale.  “Insisting that an organization embrace unwelcome members,” 
the precedents teach, “directly and immediately affects associational 
rights.”180
Of what import are those precedents when applied to Hastings’ 
policy and denial of an exemption?181  CLS relied on Dale to support its 
case, but Justice Ginsburg distinguished between compelling a group to 
include unwanted members, “with no choice to opt out” (the public 
accommodations law at issue in Dale would have forced the Boy Scouts 
to accept members it did not desire) and denying a group a “state 
subsidy” if it did not do so.182  The line between coercion and 
persuasion is critical: “CLS, in seeking what is effectively a state 
subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to modify its membership policies; 
CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it foregoes the benefits 
of official recognition.”183
Relevant here are both the distinction between carrots and sticks 
and the distinction between tolerating and supporting discrimination.  
Requiring someone to take action is different, the Court observed, than 
withholding benefits if they do not.  For this proposition, Ginsberg cited 
both Bob Jones University, in which, as described in Part III, the Court 
 177 Id. at 2984. 
 178 Id. at 2985 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000)). 
 181 The Court treats the student group’s speech and association claims as related: “Who speaks 
on its behalf, CLS reasons, colors what concept is conveyed.”  Id. at 2985.  The Court applies its 
“limited-public-forum precedents” as the appropriate framework for assessing CLS’s speech and 
association claims.  Id. 
 182 Id. at 2986. 
 183 Id. 
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upheld denial of tax-exempt status due to the university’s racially 
discriminatory policies, and Grove City College v. Bell, where the Court 
held that a private religious college’s receipt of federal financial aid 
made it subject to compliance with Title IX’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination.184  Hastings was “dangling the carrot of subsidy, not 
wielding the stick of prohibition.”185  Ginsburg explained the 
constitutional significance of the distinction: “That the Constitution may 
compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances does 
not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.”186
The majority’s reasoning here is consistent with what I describe 
elsewhere as the anti-compulsion rationale for toleration: Toleration 
requires that the state not compel, but it may persuade in favor of the 
conduct it seeks to promote, and decline to support the disfavored 
conduct.187  Notably, given the question of the relationship among 
forms of discrimination, the Court cited a decades-old precedent about 
racial discrimination, in which the Court held that a state textbook-
purchasing program that provided free textbooks even to private schools 
that discriminated on racial grounds was constitutionally infirm.  Chief 
Justice Burger stated that, because the Constitution clearly bars racial 
discrimination in state-operated schools, “it is also axiomatic that a state 
may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish 
what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.”188
The Court then considered CLS’s speech and expressive 
association rights, guided by its limited-public-forum decisions.  
Summarizing its precedents on clashes between public universities and 
student groups, Ginsburg explained that once a public university has 
opened up a limited public forum, it “may not exclude speech where its 
distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
forum . . . nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of 
viewpoint.”189  So, is the “accept-all-comers” rule reasonable, given the 
function of the RSO forum and the circumstances?  The notion of a 
university’s authority to advance its educational mission features 
centrally in the majority’s conclusion that it is.  Ginsburg placed the 
instant clash in the context of the educational mission of schools and 
 184 Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).  The only evident failure of compliance in 
this case was a refusal, on the grounds of conscience, to complete the required affirmance; the 
college had a nondiscrimination policy and there was no evidence of discrimination. 
 185 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986. 
 186 Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463 (1973)). 
 187 Elsewhere, I distinguish between “empty toleration” and “toleration as respect,” critiquing 
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence for reflecting empty toleration.  See MCCLAIN, supra note 3, at 
242-48. 
 188 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465 (quoting Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 
475-76 (M.D. Ala. 1967)). 
 189 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
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reiterates that courts should not substitute their own notions of sound 
educational policy for those of school authorities they review.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, given that the educational institution before the Court is a 
law school, she quoted Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier for the 
“oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is 
primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and State and local 
officials, and not of federal judges.”190  Of course, Hastings Law School 
is not educating children, but (generally) young adults.  But the Court, 
like many lower courts, drew on precedents about elementary and 
secondary school when considering the educational mission of 
institutions of higher learning.  First off, the Court stressed that a 
college’s “commission—and its concomitant license to choose among 
pedagogical approaches” extends beyond the classroom to 
extracurricular programs, which are “today, essential parts of the 
educational process.”191  Schools “enjoy” a “significant measure of 
authority over the type of officially recognized activities in which their 
students participate.”192
Hastings defended its policy on several grounds.  Most relevant 
here are three such grounds.  First, it analogized the forum provided by 
student groups to the law school classroom: Professors are not permitted 
to admit or exclude students based on their status or belief, so it is 
reasonable for the law school to decide that the educational experience 
afforded by student groups is “best promoted when all participants in 
the forum . . . provide equal access to all students.”193  Second, it made 
a tolerance and diversity argument that is pertinent to the question of 
how to prepare young people for participation in the democratic process 
and for citizenship: 
The Law School reasonably adheres to the view that an all-comers 
policy, to the extent it brings together individuals with diverse 
backgrounds and beliefs, “encourages tolerance, cooperation, and 
learning among students.”  And if the policy sometimes produces 
discord, Hastings can rationally rank among RSO-program goals 
development of conflict-resolution skills, toleration, and readiness to 
find common ground.194
Third, Hastings also defended its policy as conveying its decision “to 
decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which 
the people of California disapprove.”195  The embodiment of the voice 
of the people of California is, in this case, California’s educational code, 
which forbids discrimination.  Although the Court did not cite Bob 
 190 Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). 
 191 Id. at 2988-89. 
 192 Id. at 2989. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 2990 (citation omitted). 
 195 Id. 
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Jones University, and the case before it involved a firm state policy, it is 
reminiscent of the Bob Jones distinction between permitting 
discriminatory conduct that conflicts with public policy and giving 
financial support to it.  On the logic of Bob Jones University, conduct 
contrary to California’s antidiscrimination law would not be in the 
public interest or of public benefit. 
The Court concluded that Hastings’ justifications are reasonable 
“in light of the RSO forum’s purposes.”196  It observed that the policy 
allowed “substantial alternative channels” for CLS to communicate its 
message.197  This lessens the burden on First Amendment rights.198  For 
example, CLS met without RSO status and had an increased number of 
students at its events and meetings.199
The majority and concurring opinions differed sharply with Justice 
Alito’s dissent over the issue of diversity and the threat posed to it by 
Hastings’s policy.  Does diversity mean (1) that each group can form 
around its own distinctive views, and exclude those who do not share 
such views, thus creating a diverse whole out of distinct parts, or (2) 
that each group must reflect the diversity of the whole?  CLS argued 
(and Alito agreed) that Hastings’ policy was “frankly absurd” because 
there “can be no diversity of viewpoints in a forum . . . if groups are not 
permitted to form around viewpoints.”200  CLS raised the specter of 
hostile takeovers, where “saboteurs [would] infiltrate groups to subvert 
their mission and message.”201  The Court found this too hypothetical 
and noted that the school’s policy did not prevent groups from having 
rules that protect against such outcomes, and that its own code of 
conduct, which extended to RSO activities, prohibited “obstruction or 
disruption, disorderly conduct, and threats.”202
 
B.      Smith’s Featured Role 
 
Smith made an appearance when the majority concluded that the 
Constitution does not require a religious exemption.203  CLS argued that 
the Law School lacked any legitimate interest, or any interest 
reasonably related to the forum’s purpose, in urging “religious groups 
 196 Id at 2991. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 2992 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 49-50, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 
(No. 08-1371)). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. (quoting Brief of Hastings College of the Law Respondents at 43 n.16, Christian Legal 
Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)). 
 203 Id. at 2993 n.24. 
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not to favor co-religionists for purposes of their religious activities.”204  
The Court disagreed: “Exclusion, after all, has two sides.  Hastings, 
caught in the crossfire between a group’s desire to exclude and students’ 
demand for equal access, may reasonably draw a line in the sand 
permitting all organizations to express what they wish but no group to 
discriminate in membership.”205  The Court observed that whether or 
not Hastings might, by analogy to Title VII, provide an exemption for 
religious association, Smith “unequivocally answers no” to the question 
of whether Hastings must grant an exemption.206
Ginsburg stressed the harms of exclusion that the “accept-all-
comers” rule seeks to avoid.  It is here that analogies to race and sex 
discrimination play a role.  CLS argued that Hastings’ policy was 
vulnerable to constitutional attack because it “systematically and 
predictably burdens most heavily those groups whose viewpoints are 
out of favor with the campus mainstream” and favors “politically 
correct” student expression.207  Similarly, Justice Alito, in dissent, 
countered that “the Court arms public educational institutions with a 
handy weapon for suppressing the speech of unpopular groups.”208  But, 
Justice Ginsburg rejoined, the policy is still neutral even it if “has an 
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”209  
Further, if the differential impact is on groups who wish to enforce 
exclusionary membership policies, so long as the state does not target 
conduct on the basis of expressive content, “acts are not shielded from 
regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea of 
philosophy.”210  Here, the Court cited to Roberts and to other precedents 
upholding public accommodations laws barring sex discrimination 
against freedom of association claims.211  Hastings’ policy aims at 
conduct: “rejecting would-be members.”212  It aims to redress the 
perceived harms of exclusionary membership policies.  (Recall that 
states can try to promote alternatives to harmful behavior.)  It is CLS’s 
conduct, not its Christian perspective, that stands—from Hastings’s 
view point—“between the group and RSO status.”213
The Court briefly discussed—and rejected—CLS’s Free Exercise 
Clause claim.  Here it said Smith “forecloses that argument,” because it 
 204 Id. at 2993. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 2993 n.24. 
 207 Id. at 2994. 
 208 Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 209 Id. at 2994 (majority opinion) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)). 
 210 Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)). 
 211 Id. (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). 
 212 Id. at 2994. 
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“held that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of 
otherwise valid regulations of general application that incidentally 
burden religious conduct.  In seeking an exemption from Hastings’ 
across-the-board all-comers policy, CLS, we repeat, seeks preferential, 
not equal, treatment; it therefore cannot moor its request for 
accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.”214
 
C.      Justice Stevens’s Concurrence: The University’s Educational 
Mission: Why the Campus Is Not the Public Square 
 
Three features of Stevens’s concurrence warrant mention.  First, 
Smith features in support of his observation that “it is a basic tenet of 
First Amendment law that disparate impact does not, in itself, constitute 
viewpoint discrimination.”215  The predicate for this observation is that 
Hastings’ “accept-all-comers” policy was viewpoint neutral.  Even 
though it “may end up having greater consequence for religious 
groups . . . .  [T]here is . . . no evidence that the policy was intended to 
cause harm to religious groups, or that it has in practice caused 
significant harm to their operations.”216
Second, Stevens stressed that the educational mission of Hastings, 
a public university, justifies its antidiscrimination policy.  He 
analogized the discrimination at issue (on the basis of sexual 
orientation) to other forms of objectionable discrimination.  He brought 
out the idea that educational policies reflect and promote values, 
including tolerance.  Stevens interpreted the policy as reflecting a 
judgment by the school “that discrimination by school officials or 
organizations on the basis of certain factors, such as race and religion, is 
less tolerable than discrimination on the basis of other factors,” which is 
a “reasonable choice” in the context of the RSO program, even if not 
the “wisest” one.217  The RSO policy serves “pedagogical objectives” 
pertaining to promoting tolerance and other values: 
Academic administrators routinely employ antidiscrimination rules 
to promote tolerance, understanding, and respect, and to safeguard 
students from invidious forms of discrimination, including sexual 
orientation discrimination.  Applied to the RSO context, these values 
can, in turn, advance numerous pedagogical objectives.218
 214 Id. at 2995 n.27 (citation omitted) (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 
(1990)). 
 215 Id. at 2997 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 216 Id. at 2996. 
 217 Id. at 2997. 
 218 Id. 
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Stevens distinguished a public university campus from a “wholly 
public setting,” in which a religious association or secular association 
“must be allowed broad freedom to control its membership and its 
message, even if its decisions cause offense to outsiders.”219  He agreed 
with Alito’s dissent that “profound constitutional problems would arise 
if the State of California tried to ‘demand that all Christian groups admit 
members who believe that Jesus was merely human.’”220
But he explained that the campus setting is different from the 
public square: Even though, “to some ‘university students, the campus 
is their world,’ it does not follow that the campus ought to be equated 
with the public square.”221  CLS “does not want to be just a Christian 
group,” but “aspires to be a recognized student organization.”222  
Hastings is “not a legislature”—and “no state actor has demanded that 
anyone do anything outside the confines of a discrete voluntary 
academic program.”223
The university’s formative role includes inculcating norms and 
values.  Thus, by contrast to the public square, public universities have a 
“distinctive role” in modern democratic societies; religious 
organizations, and all other organizations “must abide by certain norms 
of conduct when they enter an academic community.”224  Is the public 
university, on this view, more like an institution of civil society, even 
though public, or more like an arm of government?  On the one hand, 
rhetoric about freedom of speech refers to schools—academic 
communities—as important marketplaces of ideas, suggesting an 
absence of direction about norms and values.225  On the other hand, 
Stevens stated that the public university has a distinctive role that 
justifies its imposition of certain norms and entails value judgments: 
Public universities serve a distinctive role in a modern democratic 
society.  Like all specialized government entities, they must make 
countless decisions about how to allocate resources in pursuit of their 
role.  Some of those decisions will be controversial; many will have 
differential effects across populations; virtually all will entail value 
judgments of some kind.  As a general matter, courts should respect 
universities’ judgment and let them manage their own affairs.226
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. (quoting id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
 221 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting id. at 3007 (Alito, J., dissenting)). 
 222 Id. at 2997. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 2997-98. 
 225 Here we could draw an interesting analogy to Justice O’Connor’s statement in U.S. Jaycees 
that “an association must choose its market”—that of commerce or that of ideas.  Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
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 226 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2997-98. 
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Like the majority, Stevens urged judicial deference to a 
university’s understanding of its own mission and its attendant values.  
Accordingly, the RSO program is “not an open commons that Hastings 
happens to maintain.  It is a mechanism through which Hastings confers 
certain benefits and pursues certain aspects of its educational 
mission.”227  A university need not—and cannot—“remain neutral” in 
“determining which goals” to pursue through its program and how best 
to promote those goals (although the rule implementing these value 
choices is allegedly neutral because it does not single out religious 
groups).228  The university can consider, in effect, the lack of 
congruence between those goals and the goals of an organization: 
“When any given group refuses to comply with the rules, the RSO 
sponsor need not admit that group at the cost of undermining the 
program and the values reflected therein.”229
Congruence is also an implicit consideration when Stevens 
emphasized the difference between tolerating and subsidizing groups 
whose exclusion or treatment of others conflicts with public goals.  
Here, Stevens pressed an analogy: exclusion on the basis of sexual 
orientation/sexual conduct brings to mind exclusion or mistreatment of 
other groups subjected to discrimination but now protected by anti-
discrimination laws (such as Jews, blacks, and women).  This argument 
is a bit like a slippery slope or a “where will it stop” argument, 
provoking a strong retort by Justice Alito.  Justice Stevens stated: 
In this case, petitioner excludes students who will not sign its 
Statement of Faith or who engage in “unrepentant homosexual 
conduct.”  The expressive association argument it presses, however, 
is hardly limited to these facts.  Other groups may exclude or 
mistreat Jews, blacks, and women—or those who do not share their 
contempt for Jews, blacks, and women.  A free society must tolerate 
such groups.  It need not subsidize them, give them its official 
imprimatur, or grant them equal access to law school facilities.230
This passage brings to mind classic race discrimination cases like 
Shelley v. Kraemer,231 Palmore v. Sidoti,232 and the more recent Romer 
v. Evans,233 concerning sexual orientation discrimination, which offer 
 227 Id. at 2998. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. at 2998 (emphasis added). 
 231 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive land use 
covenants). 
 232 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that state court erred in denying mother custody because 
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similar statements about the Constitution or government not supporting 
or giving effect to private prejudice.  Also notable is Stevens’s reference 
to religious, racial, and sex discrimination as things that must be 
tolerated but not supported or subsidized, with the clear implication that 
these forms of discrimination are not in sync with public goals and 
values.  Even though a goal of antidiscrimination law is full and equal 
access, Stevens is saying that when an organization’s rules are not in 
sync with a university’s antidiscrimination policies, the university need 
not give it equal access to school facilities.  This is, in other words, a 
permissible form of discrimination, explained as the difference between 
tolerating and subsidizing. 
 
D.      Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion: Reaching Students  
Where Learning Takes Place 
 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion also stressed the latitude 
afforded universities to pursue their educational missions, even as he 
acknowledged the practical difficulty that the “accept-all-comers” rule 
poses, “even if not so designed or intended,” for “certain groups to 
express their views in a manner essential to their message.”234  This 
seems, he noted, in evident tension with prior Court precedents (such as 
Dale): “A group that can limit membership to those who agree in full 
with its aims and purposes may be more effective in delivering its 
message or furthering its expressive objectives; and the Court has 
recognized that this interest can be protected against governmental 
interference or regulation.”235  Kennedy also noted, but distinguished, 
earlier Supreme Court cases about campus student groups, which 
observed, for example: “By allowing like-minded students to form 
groups around shared identities, a school creates room for self-
expression and personal development.”236  Hastings, in fact, like 
“[m]any educational institutions,” recognizes the formative role of 
student groups: students “may be shaped as profoundly by their peers as 
by their teachers.”237  This observation resonates with recent legal 
scholarship calling for greater attention to the formative role of space 
“between home and school,”238 with the “between” here being the 
Amendment 2 lacked a rational relationship to legitimate state interests and seemed “inexplicable 
by anything but animus toward the class that it affects” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 559 (1896))). 
 234 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 
(2000)). 
 237 Id. at 2999. 
 238 Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2007). 
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university campus.  Kennedy quoted Justice Powell’s concurrence in 
Regents of University of California v. Bakke: 
[A] great deal of learning . . . occurs through interactions among 
students . . . who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and 
perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from 
their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their 
most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world.239  
Thus, programs like the Hastings RSO program “facilitate interactions 
between students, enabling them to explore new points of view, to 
develop interests and talents, and to nurture a growing sense of self.”240
Is this self-exploration best achieved through maximum diversity 
among different groups or by promoting diversity within groups?  Even 
though Justice Powell, for example, earlier stressed the importance of 
diversity among groups (as did Justice Alito, in dissent here), Justice 
Kennedy argued that law students, inside and outside the classroom, 
“develop their skills” over the three years not by walling themselves off, 
but by 
participating in a community that teaches them how to create 
arguments in a convincing, rational, and respectful manner and to 
express doubt and disagreement in a professional way.  A law school 
furthers these objectives by allowing broad diversity in registered 
student organizations.  But these objectives may be better achieved if 
students can act cooperatively to learn from and teach each other 
through interactions in social and intellectual contexts.  A vibrant 
dialogue is not possible if students wall themselves off from 
opposing points of view.241
In other words, the “accept-all-comers” policy protects against such 
walling off.  Kennedy further stated that, “[t]he era of loyalty oaths is 
behind us,” and that 
[a] school quite properly may conclude that allowing an oath or 
belief-affirming requirement, or an outside conduct requirement, 
could be divisive for student relations and inconsistent with the basic 
concept that a view’s validity should be tested through free and open 
discussion.  The school’s policy therefore represents a permissible 
effort to preserve the value of its forum.242
 239 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 313 n.48 (1978) (Powell, J.)). 
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For Kennedy, then, the educative end of fostering student interaction 
across difference justifies the burdens the school’s policy places on 
groups’ self-expression. 
 
E.      Justice Alito’s Dissent: How Not to Promote  
Genuine Tolerance, Diversity, and Pluralism 
 
In his lengthy dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Scalia (the author of Smith), and Justice Thomas, Justice Alito cast the 
majority opinion as a departure from freedom of speech—and the 
protection of “the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate’”—and a 
slide into limiting freedom of expression for speech that offends 
“prevailing standards of political correctness in our country’s 
institutions of higher learning.”243  In the space of this Article, I will 
focus only on those arguments in his opinion that join issue sharply with 
the majority and concurrence over congruence, toleration, and the best 
understandings of diversity and pluralism.244  Neither Smith nor Bob 
Jones University appear in his dissent, although the Court’s freedom of 
expressive association precedents, such as Roberts and Dale, feature 
prominently. 
Alito challenged the majority’s emphasis on the distinction 
between outright prohibition and subsidy.  He asserted that subsidy, or 
funding, has little to do with the issue: “[M]ost of what CLS sought and 
was denied . . . would have been virtually cost free.”245  He warned that 
characterizing desired student activity as “a matter of funding” will 
threaten the First Amendment rights of students for whom “‘the campus 
is their world.’”246  Alito pressed the analogy between the campus and 
the town square in its importance to students’ ability to communicate 
(again quoting CLS):  
The right to meet on campus and use campus channels of 
communication is at least as important to university students as the 
right to gather on the town square and use local communication 
forums is to the citizen.247
He contended that the Court departs from prior campus speech 
cases, such as Healy, in which a public college refused to recognize a 
 243 Id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 
(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 244 Thus, I am not discussing Justice Alito’s lengthy discussion of when Hastings actually 
adopted the policy at issue or whether it enforced it uniformly.  Id. at 3000-06. 
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local chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society.248  He concluded 
that the only way to distinguish Healy, in which the student group 
prevailed, seemed to be “identity of the student group.”249  He cited 
further precedents to contend that in the present case, Hastings is 
violating the rule against viewpoint discrimination by singling out 
religious viewpoints. 
Alito argued that even if analyzed under the limited public forum 
cases, Hastings’ actions are not constitutional.  He stressed the 
significance of the university setting, where “the State acts against a 
background of tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center 
of our intellectual and philosophical tradition.”250  The Court’s 
precedents state that the university “must maintain strict viewpoint 
neutrality,” but Hastings itself engaged in viewpoint discrimination 
when it claimed that the CLS bylaws impermissibly discriminated on 
the basis of religion and sexual orientation.251
Where the majority and concurring opinions stressed the authority 
of a university to carry out an educational mission that entails value 
judgments, Justice Alito invoked the Court’s freedom of expressive 
association cases (such as Dale) and its recognition that “[t]he forced 
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s 
freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects 
in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.”252  Hastings, he claimed, singled out one category of 
expressive association for disfavored treatment: “[G]roups formed to 
express a religious message . . . were required to admit students who did 
not share their views.”253  This conflicts with Dale and Roberts and the 
other club cases: “It is now well established that the First Amendment 
shields the right of a group to engage in expressive association by 
limiting membership to persons whose admission does not significantly 
interfere with the group’s ability to convey its views.”254  Alito argued 
that Hastings’ policy, “as interpreted by the law school, also 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint regarding sexual morality”—
“that sexual conduct outside marriage between a man and a woman is 
wrongful.”255  But nothing would prohibit a group, for example, Free 
 248 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 249 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3008 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 250 Id. at 3009 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
835 (1995)). 
 251 Id. at 3009-10. 
 252 Id. at 3010-11 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)). 
 253 Id. at 3010.  He gives examples of other groups not obligated to accept students who 
supported the antithesis of their message.  Id. 
 254 Id. at 3011. 
 255 Id. at 3012. 
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Love Club, from limiting membership to persons willing to endorse the 
group’s beliefs. 
A central point of disagreement between Alito, on the one hand, 
and the majority and concurring opinions, on the other, is their 
assessment of whether the university’s policy fosters diversity and is 
consonant with pluralism.  Here Alito’s dissent, like the other opinions, 
shares the beginning premise that universities properly take interest in 
facilitating student groups.  The parties stipulated, for example, that the 
RSO forum “seeks to promote a diversity of viewpoints among 
registered student organizations, including viewpoints on religion and 
human sexuality.”256  Noting the existence of some sixty RSOs, “each 
with its own independently devised purpose,” Alito concluded: “In 
short, the RSO forum, true to its design, has allowed Hastings students 
to replicate on campus a broad array of private, independent, 
noncommercial organizations that is very similar to those that 
nonstudents have formed in the outside world.”257
However, the accept-all-comers policy is “antithetical to [this] 
design” for the same reason as if it applied to private groups off 
campus: “Forced inclusion” of members whose presence would affect in 
a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints burdens a group’s First Amendment right of expressive 
association.258  Hastings may not do this without a compelling interest, 
“unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”259  
Again, Alito stressed the analogy between the campus and the general 
public square.  A state could not have a “generally applicable law 
mandating that private religious groups admit members who do not 
share the groups’ beliefs,” for example, the State of California 
mandating that Christian groups admit members who believe Jesus was 
merely human.260  Alito then switched from what the State of California 
may not do to what Hastings may not do on campus.  He asserted: 
“Religious groups like CLS obviously engage in expressive association, 
and no legitimate state interest could override the powerful effect that 
an accept-all-comers law would have on the ability of religious groups 
to express their views.”261
What of Hastings’ argument that the policy, “by bringing together 
students with diverse views, encourages tolerance, cooperation, 
learning, and the development of conflict-resolution skills”?262  Alito 
 256 Id. at 3013. 
 257 Id. at 3013-14. 
 258 Id. at 3014. 
 259 Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 3015. 
 2011]      IN CONGRUENCE OR CONFLICT?  2005 
 
counters that these are “obviously commendable goals, but they are not 
undermined by permitting a religious group to restrict membership to 
persons who share the group’s faith.”263  Many religious groups impose 
such restrictions, (for example, “regularly differentiate between Jews 
and non-Jews”).264  “Such practices” (contra Justice Stevens’s rhetoric 
about contempt for blacks, Jews, and women) “are not manifestations of 
‘contempt’ for members of other faiths” and do not “thwart the 
objectives that Hastings endorses.”265  Strikingly, Alito asserted that 
CLS’s restrictive practices and Hastings’ goals are in harmony or 
congruent in the sense that the former will not thwart the latter.  This 
conclusion relates to his vision of pluralism, which allows diverse 
groups to flourish by controlling their own memberships: 
Our country as a whole, no less than the Hastings College of Law, 
values tolerance, cooperation, learning, and the amicable resolution 
of conflicts.  But we seek to achieve those goals through “[a] 
confident pluralism that conduces to civil peace and advances 
democratic consensus-building,” not by abridging First Amendment 
rights.266
Alito’s model of pluralism, in effect, is that we do not need congruence 
to support democracy.  It is similar to Powell’s vision in his Bob Jones 
University concurrence.  Receiving no attention in Alito’s dissent is the 
proposition that the university’s educational mission, which necessarily 
entails value judgments, distinguishes the campus from the public 
square. 
Finally, Alito warned that the “most important effect” of the 
Court’s holding is the “marginalization” of certain groups, those who 
“cannot in good conscience agree in their bylaws that they will admit 
persons who do not share their faith.”267  He cited to amicus briefs for 
conservative and orthodox religious groups, predicting their exclusion 
or relegation to second-class status.268  He concluded that the majority’s 
opinion is a serious setback to freedom of expression, and, under the 
First Amendment, to a “profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate of public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. at 3015-16 (citing Brief of Gays & Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 35, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)). 
 267 Id. at 3019. 
 268 Id. at 3019-20 (citing, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Evangelical Scholars et al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 19, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)) (asserting that affirmance 
will “allow every public college and university in the United States to exclude all evangelical 
Christian organizations”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Agudath Israel of America in Support of 
Petitioner at 3, 8, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371) (noting that affirmance 
would “point a judicial dagger at the heart of the Orthodox Jewish community in the United 
States” and permit that community to be relegated to the status of a “second-class group”). 
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open.”  He cautioned that even those who find CLS’s views 
objectionable should be concerned about the way the group has been 
treated.”269  Alito’s concern here is illustrative of the concern voiced 
that as the aims of antidiscrimination law expand, the potential for its 
conflict with religious and associational freedom expands as well.270
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this Article, I have looked back at Employment Division v. Smith 
as a case that raises the problem of congruence or conflict between 
religious and political values and the related puzzle of how to 
understand and address pluralism in our constitutional democracy.  I 
then trained a similar lens on Bob Jones University v. United States, and 
the tension between the majority opinion and Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion.  My third illustration was the resolution of these 
issues in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.  The various opinions in 
this case offer a fresh example of conflicts between claims to freedom 
of religion and association, on the one hand, and on the other, the aims 
of antidiscrimination laws and policies.  This tension arises in part from 
our constitutional and political order’s simultaneous commitment to two 
orienting ideas about the relationship between civil society and the 
state: (1) the institutions of civil society are foundational sources of 
values and virtues that undergird constitutional democracy; and (2) civil 
society’s institutions are important buffers against overbearing 
governmental power and are places that generate their own distinctive 
(and sometimes conflicting) virtues and values. 
The relevance of analogy is an ongoing issue in the newest 
generation of clashes between rights to free exercise of religion and 
association and antidiscrimination laws enacted to advance the free and 
equal citizenship of all members of society.  What is the relationship 
among discrimination based on race, sex, and sexual orientation?  In 
Christian Legal Society, for example, the majority opinion drew freely 
on precedents about prohibiting race and sex discrimination in 
education to support Hastings’ use of carrots, rather than sticks, to 
prohibit student groups from discriminating based on sexual 
orientation.271  Justice Stevens’s concurrence drew similar analogies, 
pointing out that an expressive association “may exclude or mistreat 
 269 Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 3020. 
 270 See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 146.  In Dale, the majority observed that 
as public accommodations laws have expanded to cover more places, “the potential for conflict 
between state public accommodations laws and the First Amendment rights of organizations has 
increased.”  Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000). 
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Jews, blacks, and women—or those who do not share their contempt for 
Jews, blacks, and women”: “[A] free society must tolerate such groups,” 
but “need not subsidize them.”272  In contrast, Justice Alito sharply 
objected to applying this label of “contempt” to a religious group’s 
exclusionary membership policies, and countered that “our country” 
pursues such values as “tolerance” through a “confident pluralism” that 
respects associational rights.273
My own view, which I must leave for elaboration elsewhere, is that 
analogies need not be perfect in order to be persuasive, or at least 
instructive.  It is possible to appeal to the dignitary harms of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, without denying the 
unique harms perpetuated by public and private race discrimination.274  
Moreover, important themes from the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence about race and sex, such as the role of stereotypes and 
prejudice in rationalizing laws and policies that have hindered the full 
participation of persons in society, have force when applied to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  This is evident, for 
example, in the Attorney General’s letter announcing that the Obama 
Administration would not defend DOMA in the newest round of 
challenges to it, where he intermingles citations to such jurisprudence 
about race and sex with citations to opinions, such as Lawrence and 
Romer, in which the Court reveals growing awareness of how such 
prejudice and stereotypes unconstitutionally single out homosexuals.275
Finally, a remaining challenging question is whether religious 
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, even if not constitutionally 
required (in light of Smith), are nonetheless appropriate.  Again, I can 
only make a brief observation.  Due respect for securing free and equal 
citizenship may justify insisting that, when associations enter the 
commercial sphere or are fairly deemed to be public accommodations, 
they must abide by public norms of antidiscrimination.  At the same 
time, due respect for pluralism, along with prudential concerns over 
“backlash”—mobilizing religious groups to “fight against civil rights 
reforms” instead of working out “practical accommodations,” may 
counsel against too strong an insistence on congruence.276
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